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Abstract 
Equity Home Bias was first exposed by French and Poterba (1991) as the overweight of 
domestic equity in an investor portfolio when compared to the optimal weight in the 
international diversified portfolio. Home Bias has been since then a puzzle to the financial 
literature due to its persistence over time and lack of sustained explanations. In this study, 
we intend to analyse the factors that drive Equity Home Bias, in particular over the period 
most affected by two major shocks in the economy, namely the Global Financial Crisis 
and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. The analysis uses the data from a sample of 21 
EU countries over the period from 2001 to 2015. 
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Resumo  
O conceito de Equity Home Bias referido pela primeira vez no estudo de French e Poterba 
(1991) como o excesso de peso de ações domésticas no portfolio de um investidor quando 
comparado com o que resultaria da combinação ótima no portfolio diversificado a nível 
internacional. O Home Bias é desde então um puzzle da literatura financeira devido à sua 
persistência ao longo do tempo e devido à falta de argumentos que consigam explicar o 
fenómeno. Neste estudo, pretendemos estudar os fatores que determinam o Equity Home 
Bias, em particular durante o período mais afetado por dois grandes choques na economia, 
nomeadamente a Crise Financeira Global e a Crise da Dívida Soberana Europeia. A 
análise incide sobre os dados de uma amostra de 21 países da UE no período entre 2001 
e 2015. 
Palavras-chave: Equity Home Bias; Crise Financeira Global; Crise da Dívida Soberana 
Europeia  
Classificação JEL: G01; G11; G41 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies on portfolio diversification and its effects have followed the pioneer work 
of Markowitz (1952, 1959), and the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964), on portfolio optimization and 
extended it to the international context (Grubel, 1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Lessard, 
1973). The conclusion is that there are larger diversification gains that drive from holding 
a global portfolio. Hence, according to theoretical literature1, cross-border diversification 
of equity portfolios offers potential gains to investors. 
However, despite these gains, empirical research has showed that investors tend to 
overweight their portfolios with domestic equity. This phenomenon is called Home Bias. 
Many empirical studies have analysed this puzzle. Examples are the works by French and 
Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995). They mention a 90%/10% relation on the 
weight of domestic equity to foreign equity in the US and Japan’s portfolio in 1989. For 
the UK, the relation was of 80% to 20%2. 
Many studies on international finance have been trying to come up with several 
explanations for this puzzle, yet there is no consensus nor one argument that stands over 
time.  
Initially, institutional factors such as the existence of formal barriers to trade and high 
transaction costs were thought to be able to explain the observed weights of domestic 
holdings in portfolios (see for example, Stulz, 1981a,b;  Adler and Dumas, 1983; Black, 
1974; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Ahearne et al, 2004 among 
others). Yet, for the last decades, great financial and technological development and the 
abolishment of international investment barriers, have not solved or reduced Home Bias 
as expected. In fact, from 1994 to 2004 the phenomenon looks as it has stabilized (Kho 
et al, 2009)3.   
Researchers started to propose a different strand of arguments to try to explain Home 
Bias, such as behavioural explanations. These were focused on the investors’ mindset, 
                                                 
1 See also (Solnik, 1974b; Grauer and Hakansson, 1987; Eldor et al, 1988; De Santis and Gerard, 1997) 
2 The adjusted market value in June 1990, as reported by French and Poterba (1991), is $2941.3 for the 
US, $1632.9 for Japan and $849.8 for the UK. 
3 The average US home bias, from a sample of 46 countries  
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their culture and beliefs and their language, among others, in order to complete existing 
literature and hence provide enhancements to its possible causes. Yet, these seem to be 
incomplete, in the sense that the phenomenon is not still fully understood.  
In fact, Equity Home Bias has been proven to hold for both individual and institutional 
investors, for stocks and for bonds, and for nearly all countries examined (for more recent 
studies, see for example Chan et al, 2005; Sørensen et al, 2007; De Moor and Vanpée, 
2013). Also, Home Bias can be extrapolated to a wider economic context, due to its 
presence in consumption (Lewis, 1999), trade (Obstefeld and Rogoff, 2000), mergers and 
acquisitions (Grote and Umber, 2007), and even in academic research (Karolyi, 2012), as 
summarized by Cooper et al (2013). 
Since all the explanations regarded by literature have failed to explain completely the 
phenomenon, we are left with a literature gap, which is why this is still considered a 
puzzle.  
With this study, we intend to gather information on what most has influenced Equity 
Home Bias between 2001 and 2015 and assess whether there were changes in the impact 
of the usual driving factors given two major shocks in the economy, over the period 
(Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis).  
Our results indicate that these shocks changed the impact of the explanatory variables on 
the Home Bias, in most cases magnifying their effects. Overall results are supportive of 
the hypotheses set based on the possible explanations for Home Bias provided by 
literature. 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review, 
which focuses on the theoretical approaches on the optimal portfolio model and its 
connection to Equity Home Bias. In addition, the chapter reviews the Equity Home Bias 
phenomenon and its evolution through time and summarizes the main explanations 
proposed by the literature. In Chapter 3 we cover the main hypotheses and arguments for 
the relation of the Equity Home Bias with the proposed explanations. In Chapter 4 we 
describe our data, sample and methodology, and the empirical variable used in the 
proposed specification model. We also summarize the main characteristics of the crises 
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described. In Chapter 5 we present and discuss the estimation results. Finally, Chapter 6 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
The following chapter is divided into three sections. The first one explains the reasoning 
of the Equity Home Bias phenomenon, later we present the empirical results from other 
studies related to our theme to observe its persistence through time. Finally, we expose 
and characterize the different possible explanations for this puzzle.  
2.1 A Puzzling Phenomenon 
The first work on portfolio optimization was developed by Markowtitz (1952, 1959) and 
was complemented, on an international context, by Grubel (1968), Levy and Sarnat 
(1970), and Lessard (1973). Also, Solnik (1974a) and Grauer and Hakansson (1987) 
express the same idea of a reduction of risk of an investment portfolio by incorporating 
foreign securities.  
Following such works, a large body of financial literature was developed, building on the 
effects of international diversification in portfolios. The common conclusion focused on 
the large benefits of international diversification in securities portfolios (García-Herrero 
and Vasquéz, 2013).  
Figure 1 intends to prove such conclusion (in a simple mean-variance analysis on a two-
country example), by showing that for the same amount of risk, the return is higher when 
two assets are combined, rather than 100% of one asset.  
Figure 1: Efficient Frontier (US and Non-US portfolios) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cooper et al, 2013 
Note: The authors plotted the mean and standard deviation of annualized monthly returns, estimated over 
January 1970 to December 2011, for various convex combinations of a purely U.S. portfolio and a purely 
5 
 
foreign one. Point A is the U.S.’ actually chosen mix. Point B on the curve represents a portfolio that 
consists of 71% foreign equities and has the same standard deviations as the pure U.S. portfolio. 
The figure follows the prediction of financial theory, which indicates that given what an 
investor holds, international diversification would reduce the risk significantly. The 
authors still highlighted that an analysis of mean-variance optimization using ex-post 
means could be questionable, however, despite the possibility of this graphic raising 
sampling errors, the presence of this phenomenon is so wide that it could not be dismissed 
as pure chance.  
As we will demonstrate ahead, theory has not been translating into practice, which is 
puzzling due to the proven benefits of concentrating both domestic and foreign stock on 
a portfolio and the not known offsetting benefits of holding one entirely domestic.  
In conclusion, the not fully exploited international gains by investors, translates into an 
overinvestment in domestic stocks relative to the optimal portfolio that is called Equity 
Home Bias, first developed by French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995). 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
As observed in the previous section, an investor’s equity portfolio should be highly 
diversified and if not, then there is a deviation from the optimal portfolio, which is called 
Equity Home Bias. In this section we will approach the evolution of this phenomenon 
throughout the last decades and will infer on what the literature poses on its behaviour. 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) show that in 1984, 98% of an US investor’s equity portfolio 
was filled with domestic equity against a market capitalization of US equity of 36.4%. 
However, there were still other countries that faced higher differences, such as Germany 
with 75.4% against 3.2% and 94.2% against 1.1% for Spain. 
Mondria & Wu’s (2010) conclusions (based on data provided by Frank Warnock4) state 
that between 1980 and 1985 the portfolio of American investors was made of 98.5% 
domestic equities, which translated into an average equity home bias of 96.8% during that 
period. In the following years, in the period between 1985 and 1994, there was a decrease 
                                                 
4 Co-author of Ahearne et al (2004) 
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in the share of domestic assets of almost 10pp. After 1994, it has stabilized until the end 
of the sample – 2000.  
These conclusions can be observed in the following figure that presents the evolution of 
the share of domestic equities and the evolution of home bias in the US portfolio, from 
the first quarter of 1980 to the last quarter of 2000. The declining era of the mid-80’s to 
mid-90’s is easily observable and is especially due to the abolishment of institutional 
restrictions to international financial development. 
Figure 2: Home Bias and Share of Domestic Equities in US Portfolio 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mondria and Wu, 2010 
 
Studying a larger sample period, Amadi (2004) found that from 1986 to 2001, 
international diversification had increased in each country out of 12 industrialized 
economies, and 7 of them showed dramatic increases in the foreign portfolio 
compositions during the 90’s5, going from an average of around 7% in 1994 to around 
37% in 2001. 
Additional contributions were made by Sørensen et al (2007) for the period 1993 to 2003, 
who concluded that the home bias, both in equities and bonds, decreased for 24 OECD 
                                                 
5 The countries included are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa, and Spain   
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countries6, with the Equity Home Bias decreasing, on average, from 83% to 67% and the 
Debt Home Bias from 63% to 52%. 
Baele et al (2007) introduces an explanation focusing on the euro zone, and concludes 
that since the introduction of the common currency, the diversification trend has been 
strong. Cooper et al (2013) also follow that statement, but build on a smaller sample of 
the four biggest industrialized countries and four emerging countries from 2001 to 20107. 
Home Bias shows a decreasing tendency over the last decades, mostly due to the 
enhancement and the availability of telecommunications and technological innovations, 
the easiness in the access to the internet, the diminishment of transaction costs and the 
abolishment of formal barriers to foreign investments. According to models based on 
institutional factors, it was expected a significant drop in the Home Bias, however that 
decrease has been very slow, as portfolios remain severely under-diversified.  
 
2.3 Main Explanations 
As explained in the two previous sections, Home Bias is a puzzling phenomenon that has 
persisted through time. The deviations observed between the portfolio weights and the 
world market weights, considering the ICAPM optimal portfolio as the benchmark, can 
be viewed as abnormal and in need of an explanation. 
Different contributions on the Home Bias have stressed on the possible justifications for 
such behaviour, and following the approach provided by French and Poterba (1991), we 
present two broad explanations: Institutional or Fundamental – institutional or economic 
“factors may reduce returns from investing abroad or that may explicitly limit investors’ 
ability to hold foreign stocks” – and Behavioural – “[explanation that] focuses on investor 
behaviour”.   
 
                                                 
6 The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US 
7 Industrialized countries include: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the US; emerging countries 
include: Argentina, Malaysia, Poland, and Turkey 
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2.3.1 Institutional Explanations 
Direct Barriers 
In the 70’s, capital controls were preponderant in the restrictions of equity flows and as 
such, were a satisfying justification for the disproportion of domestic equity in an 
investor’s portfolio, however, nowadays such reason is no longer broadly accepted 
(French and Poterba, 1991). 
Given the financial globalization and the efforts to diminish protectionism world-wide, 
most investors from western developed countries do not seem to be especially affected 
by institutional regulation, however, a country’s policy on exchange regulation and 
capital restrictions is a factor that affects an investor’s opportunity to widen its 
international portfolio both ways. This means that it may difficult a domestic investor to 
approach foreign assets but also for a foreigner to invest in the domestic market (Cooper 
et al, 2013).  
Transaction costs associated with holding a foreign asset are commonly described as 
commissions, fees and market impact costs or liquidity costs8 and were not portrayed as 
being one robust justification for Home Bias because they would have to be unrealistically 
high as to discourage foreign investment (Ahearne et al, 2004; Jeske, 2001). French and 
Poterba (1991) also emphasize that transaction costs ought to be lower in more liquid 
markets, therefore investments should be made towards those markets and not necessarily 
to the domestic market. Finally, the authors also state that given the large amounts of 
equity flows world-wide, transaction costs fail to explain Home Bias by themselves. 
However, opposite conclusions emerged when focusing on the impact of taxes in the 
Equity Home Bias. Black (1974) considers that severely taxed investors tend to prefer the 
domestic market and in his model, international markets are segmented and the expected 
rate of return on the asset is affected by the existence of taxes, which leads to the decrease 
of the risk premium, conducing ultimately to the reduction of international diversification 
gains.  
                                                 
8 Liquidity costs are intended to measure the deviation of the transaction price from the price that would 
have prevailed had the trade not occurred. See Ahearne et al (2004) for more details. 
9 
 
Lewis (1999) extended Black’s (1974) model by focusing on shares, in two-countries and 
in the holding of purchasing power parity. By considering that taxes represented a 
participation cost to foreign markets, the author presented that this variable decreased the 
optimal proportion invested in the domestic market by foreigners. Finally, the author 
showed that when costs or taxes increased, the domestic holdings of foreign stocks 
decreased, proving that transaction costs influenced the reticence of investors to 
international diversification.  
However, the development and liberalization of capital markets has been weakening 
direct barriers to international investment and as economies become more deregulated, 
the less explanatory this phenomenon is. Its persistence, thus, demands additional 
explanations. 
Information Asymmetry 
The preference for domestic equity due to information asymmetries is a popular 
explanation among the literature and intends to show that in the presence of different 
information, risk-averse investors will prefer stocks they have more information in 
because they perceive them as less risky. Those stocks are usually the domestic ones 
(Cooper et al, 2013). Merton (1987) concludes that information costs may affect an 
investor’s behaviour given its perception of risk. This inference has had empirical 
support, such as investment in large firms being a great proportion of foreign equity 
portfolios (Kang and Stulz, 1997), information flows being an important element of cross-
border equity transactions (Portes and Rey, 2005) and investors leaning towards holding 
local companies’ stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) or at least, geographically close. 
Information advantages, from a domestic investor point of view, range from the business 
practices in his home country, to the economic and political context, to the language 
(meaning that there is a perfect interpretation of all news articles and financial reports) 
and to the adaptation costs to different cultural or religious habits (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001).  
In addition, it would be expected for informational advantage to provide greater directions 
in stock picking, which would lead that investor to realize higher returns on his equity 
investments. Dvorak (2005) concludes that domestic investors in the Indonesian market 
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outperform foreigners and Hau (2001) explains the lower returns of Germany non-
residents and German non-speakers relative to locals. Despite Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2000) and Huang and Shiu (2009) showing that for the Finnish and Taiwanese markets, 
respectively, the outperformance of foreigners relative to domestic investors was greater, 
the foreign investors’ sample was composed mostly by professionals, who are supposed 
to be more experienced, which means that those results may not be due to genuine 
information advantages. Actually, Malloy (2005) and Bae et al (2008), compare the 
precision of earnings forecasts of domestic analysts to non-resident analysts and conclude 
that locals outperform foreigners, which expresses the idea that indeed there are 
information advantages for residents.   
Kang and Stulz (1997) even conclude that foreign investors are more drawn to invest in 
Japanese companies they know better even though those may have lower expected returns 
than other Japanese stocks. 
Even though many proxies for information asymmetry have turn out to have significant 
coefficients (Cooper et al, 2013) and that it is the one explanation that has received most 
of the attention (Amadi, 2004), Jeske (2001) indicates that depending on the sufficiently 
high/low signal a domestic investor receives on the expected return, informed investors 
would hold more/less of domestic stocks. In theory, if an investor holds more and better 
information on domestic assets, he faces lower variance of domestic equity returns and 
his expected returns ought to differ from the foreigner’s. Thus, the characteristic of the 
signal (high or low) on a domestic stock affects the expected return, which should mean 
that, at least in some periods, uninformed investors’ holdings on domestic equity would 
surpass the ones from domestic investors, i.e. “the home bias would be reversed in periods 
in which domestic investors gather a signal indicating low returns.” (Jeske, 2001). 
However, in reality, such behaviour was not observed, since there has been a persistent 
Equity Home Bias throughout the years, as we mentioned in the previous section.  
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Hedging Opportunities 
Most financial literature considers that holding a domestic stock provides hedging for two 
home-country specific risks: inflation and non-traded assets.  
One of these hedging opportunities surfaces when the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
does not hold9, which translates into the existence of different inflation rates across 
countries, implying a greater demand for international securities to hedge domestic 
inflation risk. 
A perfect hedge against inflation risk would have been provided by index bonds, however 
they are not available to most countries (Cooper et al, 2013). Domestic equities are then 
perceived as a second-best hedge alternative, considering the uncertainty about future 
inflation rates (Friend et al, 1976), but only if risk aversion exceeds unity and if there is 
a positive correlation between domestic equity returns and inflation rates. However, since 
the disappearance and re-appearance of inflation linked bonds in markets such as the US 
and the UK did not match any accordingly variation in the Home Bias (Cooper et al, 
2013), domestic stocks could not be considered as a great alternative.  
The models of Adler and Dumas (1983) and Stulz (1981b) evidence that different 
inflation rates among different countries create a demand for assets to hedge for inflation, 
leading to a probable different equity portfolio among investors because each one in each 
country consumes different goods, which leads to different inflation risks. Later, Cooper 
and Kaplanis (1994) examined the role of inflation and equity results and concluded that 
the home bias could not be explained by inflation hedging unless investors have very low 
levels of risk aversion.  
Thus, for the rationale of this hedging opportunity to prevail, there would have to be a 
positive correlation between inflation and returns, so home bias could be explained if 
domestic equities provided a hedge against inflation risk (Mishra, 2015). Boudoukh and 
Richardson (1993) find that there is a positive relation between nominal stock returns and 
inflation over longer periods. Kim and In (2005) show that for a very short horizon (1 
month) or a very long period (greater than 128 months) there is a positive correlation, as 
                                                 
9 A robust part of the literature has rejected the hypothesis of Purchasing Power Parity, except perhaps in 
the very long run (Froot and Rogoff, 1995) 
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for the period between, there would be a negative correlation. Fama (1981) and Barnes et 
al (1999) do not conclude in terms of horizon, the authors just show that there is a negative 
correlation between stock returns and inflation rates. Given this context, investors’ real 
wealth would already be compromised and their domestic equity returns would diminish 
as well. Thus, investors would short their domestic holdings to hedge against inflation 
risk, which is the opposite of reality (Cooper et al, 2013). 
In a final note, consumption prices evolve differently across countries even after 
translating into the same currency, which affects real returns. Thus, depending on what 
currency an investor uses, nominal returns from a certain asset diverge. Portfolio choice 
may then be affected in the presence of real exchange risk, that surfaces when holding the 
same asset, investors’ real returns are different. Fidora et al (2007) show that Home Bias 
was reported to be higher in countries that have higher exchange rate volatility, 
performing as a higher bias in countries with low volatility of returns. 
Another source of country-specific risk that could clarify the home bias, focuses on the 
wealth of nontraded assets such as human capital. The rationale is that price uncertainty 
surrounding nontraded goods creates a motive to invest in domestic equities and if 
nontraded labour income is negatively correlated with domestic equity returns, then 
domestic equities are a hedge for labour income (Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2003; Cooper 
et al, 2013). However, empirical evidence on this correlation has mixed results. Baxter 
and Jermann (1997) show that human capital returns are highly correlated with domestic 
returns but not with foreign stock returns, which implies that to hedge such risk an 
investor would short sell domestic stocks, rather than home-biasing their portfolios. In 
contrasting results, Bottazzi et al (1996) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2002) find 
negative correlations between human capital and domestic equity. More empirical works 
have concluded that hedging the risk of nontradables fails to explain Home Bias, because 
addressing it only leads to a minor bias towards domestic assets, which is not large enough 
to explain the Equity Home Bias observed (Pesenti and Van Wincoop, 2002) and because 
investors tend to create their portfolios in such a way that the correlation goes up rather 
than down, as it would be expected (Massa and Simonov, 2006). 
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Governance and Regulation 
In a country, a good legal system backed by laws and regulations that protect investors, 
aligned with a balanced level of economic and financial development, contribute to 
benefit from good governance. 
Kho et al (2009) mention that a governance improvement has a direct impact in Home 
Bias because a firm’s value is maximized with less insider ownership, which leads to 
greater holdings of portfolio investors, that would not only include domestic investors but 
also, foreign ones.  
Cooper et al (2013) link the lack of transparency with information asymmetries, affecting 
therefore an investor’s expected returns, but also mention that poor governance practices 
and the non-existence of suitable accounting standards within a company result in higher 
information costs and less protection to minority shareholders.  
Dahlquist et al (2003) suggest that free float market capitalization should be used to 
approach Home Bias instead of total market capitalization due to the nontraded equity of 
controlling shareholders. However, there still seemed to be a strong bias after that 
correction.  
Giannetti and Simonov (2006) find that all categories of investors (domestic and foreign, 
institutional and small individual) who are presumably tilted towards only security 
benefits, are reluctant to invest in companies with weak corporate governance and Leuz 
et al (2010) conclude that foreign investors are stimulated by countries with good outsider 
protection and with ownerships structures that provide no governance problems.  
After presenting these rationla arguments, and given the persistence of Home Bias, 
academics were led to believe that institutional explanations only explained partially this 
phenomenon. This conducted financial literature to start focusing on a different strand.  
 
2.3.2 Behavioural Explanations  
These behavioural explanations stand on the principle that investors are not completely 
rational when making an investment decision (Ricciardi, 2008).  
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Familiarity 
The familiarity bias has an interesting weight in the Home Bias (Huberman, 2001; 
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Chan et al, 2005), as it is “[…] associated with a general 
sense of comfort with the known and discomfort with - even distaste for and fear of - the 
alien and distant." (Huberman, 2001). Complementary, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) and 
Pool et al (2012) evidenced that this comfort is generally associated with less experienced 
investors since it is viewed as a central cognitive element of place attachment (Scannell 
and Gifford, 2010).   
As mentioned in the information asymmetry explanation, investors tend to have more 
stocks of large firms in their portfolio (Merton, 1987) because they have facilitated access 
to information of such firms, meaning that they have access to more quantity and, usually, 
to more quality of data. This translates in knowing them better, being more familiar with 
their history and accomplishments, positive or negative. 
Underinvestment in foreign assets is explained by Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) as being 
due to the culture of a society and its distance towards the other market. The distinction 
is based on a society more uncertainty averse (which invests less in foreign stocks) and 
on a more individualistic one (that invests more in foreign stocks). 
Overconfidence 
An investor who believes he has full knowledge concerning a determined investment is 
more familiar with those assets (which are typically domestic assets) and has the 
perception to have an information advantage, which leads to an overweight of domestic 
stocks as Cooper et al (2013) explained, based on the work by Tversky (1991) and Fox 
and Tversky (1995). 
Patriotism 
Morse and Shive (2011) found that more patriotic countries (based on questionnaires of 
the World Values Survey), are more home biased even after controlling for transaction 
barriers, diversification benefits, information and familiarity. 
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Beliefs and Conservatism  
Given the information available, investors tend to focus on and give more importance to 
that which confirms their beliefs, even when new information arises, they are more 
reticent to change them and maintain relying on their priors. Ritter (2003) considers that 
a variation of events might lead investors to underreact, given the conservatism bias, 
although when focusing on a long enough pattern, those conservatives will adjust and 
possibly will translate into an overreaction, underweighting the long-term average.  
Also, Lord et al (1979) argue that after an investor forms an opinion, he usually hangs on 
it for too long and has a very inactive information-searching position that contradicts his 
beliefs. Investors might go as far as when finding such evidence, treat it with scepticism.  
Hour-shifting 
Sendi and Belallah (2010) explain that the different time zones across the world can be a 
psychological barrier to international investment because efficiency is diminished with 
geographically far markets. This statement is sustained under the idea that at any time of 
the day, there are closed financial markets and, even though an investor can obtain the 
information set about assets, managing and holding a global portfolio becomes more 
difficult and cannot be done optimally.  
Retrenchment 
In the presence of a shock in the economy there is added uncertainty that should lead to 
a home bias increase (Ellsberg, 1961, Heath and Tversky, 1991).  
This approach is also present in the more recent and developing retrenchment literature, 
that concludes that, under these situations, investors tend to leave foreign markets and 
focus on domestic ones (Milesi-Ferreti and Tille, 2011; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; 
Fratzscher, 2012). More evidence is shown by Goetzmann et al (2001), Ratanapakorn and 
Sharma (2002) and Das and Uppal (2004) that state the weakening of potential gains from 
international diversification during market crisis.  
The increase in uncertainty (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Easley and O'Hara, 
2010) and the boost in the familiarity bias (Cao et al., 2011) are also documented as a 
cause in the reduction of the foreign portfolio share, if investors are ambiguity averse. 
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In conclusion, nowadays the big debate regarding the explanations for Home Bias is 
mainly focused on the dichotomy Institutional/Fundamental vs Behavioural explanations, 
however the last are difficult to construct and to measure. In the following chapter, we 
will present the main hypotheses for our empirical model based on the theories and 
explanations abovementioned.   
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3. Main Arguments and Hypotheses 
In this chapter, we develop the hypotheses for our work based on the theories and studies 
on Equity Home Bias presented previously. 
Direct Barriers 
Financial Openness 
As discussed previously, financial barriers seem to affect positively Home Bias, hence 
financial market openness gives investors the incentives to hold foreign assets and 
therefore to benefit from international diversification (Bose et al, 2014). 
Taxes 
One of the most common transaction cost, is the impact of taxes in the investors’ decision 
process. These are expected to diminish the gains of international diversification and 
hence, increase Equity Home Bias (Lewis, 1999). 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Direct Barriers are expected to decrease international 
investment flows, hence are expected to increase Equity Home Bias. 
 
Information Asymmetry 
Geographical Distance 
The interaction of economic agents and exchanges is affected by the geographical 
distance between countries and hence, investors prefer to be geographically close to 
reduce information costs and diminish any differences (cultural, linguistic, legal, etc) 
(Guiso et al, 2005).  
Neighbouring countries are more incited to have better knowledge on each other, not only 
due to better media coverage but also to better tourist and business links and Portes and 
Rey (2005) even state that with a higher distance, the more expensive the travel is, and 
hence cultural differences are expected to arise and to be stronger. Eventually, this will 
weaken business links. 
Cooper et al (2016) define Pure Home Bias as the amount by which home bias exceeds 
the level that would be predicted for a foreign country with zero “distance” and answer 
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the question “To what extent is the home country different from a hypothetical foreign 
country that has a “distance'' of zero?”. They have concluded that for most countries the 
Pure Home Bias is zero, which means that distance has a decisive role in an investor’s 
equity allocation policy. Since geographical proximity provides investors lower 
information gathering costs due to cultural similarities and familiarity, they are more 
drawn to invest in such contexts.  
Considering the cultural and language differences, familiarity is also widely used under 
the information asymmetry explanation given that information flows and information 
understanding is better perceived when those differences are low. 
Internet Use 
An alternative proxy for information flows worldwide is the number of internet users. 
Internet has been boosting and is one of the basis for globalization since it allows 
investors, for example, the access to more information and quickly than ever before. Even 
though, it solely does not explain diversification by itself, it most definitely incited the 
familiarity on the English language and its dissemination throughout all information, 
which leads to a greater number of people gathering and studying such information, 
diminishing the language and the availability barriers (Amadi, 2004).  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): International information asymmetry is expected to increase 
Home Bias, since it increases information costs and decreases net returns affected by 
foreign assets. 
 
Hedging Opportunities 
Exchange Rate Risk 
Monetary unions and a single currency diminishes the need for hedging when trading 
either goods or financial assets, as stated in the study of Baele et al (2007), which reduced 
Home Bias.10 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Exchange rate barriers are expected to increase Home Bias 
                                                 
10 Baele et al (2007) conclusion proved to be true for EMU countries 
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Familiarity 
Exchange Trade 
Portes and Rey (2005) state that there is a connection (in terms of investment and 
distance) between the trade of consumption goods and financial assets. 
In addition, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2008) concluded that bilateral equity investment is 
strongly correlated with underlying patterns of trade in goods and services. Cooper et al 
(2013) compared the average trade volume and the Equity Home Bias for developed 
economies (OECD countries) and for developing countries (the 50 countries with the 
lowest scores on the Human Development Index), and concluded that, even though in the 
latter the increase in trade was much higher, equity home bias has only decreased 
marginally and remains at much higher levels. The following figure translated this 
analysis. 
Figure 3: Average Trade Volume and Equity Home Bias for OECD Countries (left) and 
Developing Markets (right) 
Source: Cooper et al (2013) 
Since our sample is composed by developed countries, our expectations are that higher 
trade is related with lower Home Bias.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Higher trade flows between countries are expected to 
decrease Home Bias 
20 
 
 
Governance and Regulation 
Domestic Governance 
Cooper et al (2013) state that opposing the foreign bias11 logic, a country with high 
standards at home should make foreign countries less appealing. With this rationale, 
Equity Home Bias is expected to increase with higher domestic governance. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Domestic Governance high quality standards and regulation 
are associated with more (increased) Home Bias 
 
Concentration 
Company and Industry Concentration 
The more industry diversified a country is (and hence, with a larger opportunity set in the 
home country), and the larger (listed) companies, the less predisposition there is for 
international diversification. Familiarity is related to this argument, meaning that large 
firms are more noticeable, which implies that information gathering costs and 
asymmetries are lower and also, they are more liquid than small firms (in general) 
reducing transaction costs (Cooper et al, 2016).  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): In countries where stock markets have fewer investable 
opportunities with regard to companies and industries, Home Bias is lower 
 
Size 
Market Size 
As reported by the ICAPM theory, investors should diversify according to their country’s 
share of world capitalization, hence this hypothesis serves to prove financial theory. 
However, empirical evidence (Amadi, 2004; Mishra, 2015) shows that a larger country is 
                                                 
11 Foreign bias is the relative underweight of securities from countries that are far from home 
geographically, economically, culturally, or informationally 
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expected to have better diversification opportunities at home and that if there is an 
increase in the home country share in the world capitalization, then the investor would 
decrease his or her foreign investments.  
Hypothesis 7 (H7): In large countries, with greater opportunity set at home, Home 
Bias is less significant 
 
Retrenchment 
Theories of home bias and of portfolio choice under uncertainty both predict that the 
home bias should increase during a financial crisis (Mishra, 2015). Financial crises 
originate mistrust in financial institutions and in governments creating a downward trend 
in business confidence. 
We explore/test whether Home Bias changes in periods of financial and economic crises. 
 Hypothesis 8 (H8): In situations of greater uncertainty, Home Bias is expected to 
increase, due to retrenchment behaviour 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Hypotheses  
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the set of hypotheses and what is the expected sign of the relation. 
In the next chapter, we present the data and methodological approach to test our 
hypotheses.  
H1 Direct Barriers Positive
H2 Information Asymmetries Positive
H3 Hedging Opportunities Positive
H4 Familiarity Negative
H5 Domestic Governance Positive
H6 Concentration Negative
H7 Size Positive
H8 Retrenchment Positive
Hypotheses Number Argument
Expected relation with 
Home Bias
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4. Methodological Aspects 
In this chapter, we describe the data and present the model specification we use to test the 
hypotheses approached in the previous chapter. Additionally, we describe the variables 
used in the model. 
4.1 Sample period and economic shocks 
Our sample period covers two major economic shocks that affected the countries in our 
sample, namely the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Below we provide a brief explanation of those events. 
4.1.1 Global Financial Crisis 
The more recent financial crisis is considered as the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930’s and is known as the “Great Recession”. It was first originated 
in the US, after BNP Paribas announcing that it was ceasing activity in three hedge funds 
specialized in US mortgage debt. House prices abruptly decreased and subsequently there 
was a reduction in the construction activity.  
The transition from the housing market to financial institutions and financial markets in 
the US was swift and a year after, in September 2008, the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt.  
Within a month, the domino effect had already taken place and the global financial system 
was compromised, with governments having to inject vast amounts of money into their 
banks to prevent them from collapsing. Credit flows to the private sector became scarce 
and business and consumer confidence severely affected.  
To prevent the recession from worsening, several stimulus and coordination actions took 
place, such as the creation of the G-2012, as well as the implementation by Central Banks 
of non-conventional monetary policies (Quantitative Easing). 
                                                 
12 G-20 comprises a mix of the world’s largest advanced and emerging economies, representing about two-
thirds of the world’s population, 85% of global gross domestic product and over 75% of global trade. Its 
members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the European Union. 
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In January 2011, the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that “[…] this 
financial crisis was avoidable, […] widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets, […] 
dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically 
important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis, […] a combination of 
excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put the financial system 
on a collision course with crisis, […] the government was ill prepared for the crisis, and 
its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets, […] 
there was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics, […] collapsing mortgage-
lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of 
contagion and crisis, […] over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this 
crisis, […] the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of 
financial destruction.”. 
 
4.1.2 The impact of the crisis in the European Union 
Globalization led to the widespread of the crisis that, despite having started in the US, 
severely affected most European economies even though some of their banks were not 
very exposed to the US mortgage derivatives securitisation (Nemeth, 2011). All EU 
countries were affected, both EMU countries and non-euro ones, however in a different 
degree, depending on having been through real-estate bubbles and on the level of 
economic vulnerability (Plamadeala, 2014).  
Denmark was the first country to enter the recession, followed by Estonia and Latvia. 
Following their steps were Germany, Spain and Great Britain leading to a very 
undesirable outcome where eventually all EU countries suffered negatively from the 
global financial crisis (Levine and Gerow, 2010).  
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Figure 4: European Union Real GDP Evolution (Annual YoY%) 
 Source: Bloomberg Finance, L.P. 
 
Figure 4 evidences the robust decline in the YoY change in the European Union countries’ 
real GDP from 2001 to 2015, evidencing clearly that 2008 and 2009 were the years with 
the largest GDP decrease. Later, 2012 also embraced a further negative outcome. 
To stabilize financial markets, not only the EU Central Banks intervened, by lowering 
interest rates and quantitative easing, but also Governments acted to face the financial 
crisis, by buying shares in banks needing recapitalization and expanding insurance on 
guarantees for depositors and even, for some cases, guarantees for banks. 
However, such actions were not enough in some countries and the credit problems 
continued (Jackson, 2010). 
4.1.3 European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Following the perseverance of the credit problems that arose from the global financial 
crisis and persisted even after central banks and governments’ intervention, EU countries 
faced a period of slower economic growth. In fact, such period was characterized by the 
collapse of financial institutions, high government debt and the substantial bond yield 
spread increases in peripheral countries. Consequently, the most indebted European 
countries were unable to repay or refinance their government debt.  
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Figure 5: 10Y Government Bond Spread to German Bund 
 
Source: Bloomberg Finance, L.P. 
Note: Cyprus was disregarded from this analysis due to data unavailability 
Figure 5 shows the impact of the sovereign debt crisis in the peripheral Eurozone 
countries’ government bond yields. In late 2009, the spread started to increase in all 
countries but mainly in Greece13. 
In late 2009 the sovereign crisis affected several European countries such as Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain, Greece, Italy and Cyprus. These countries, required third-party assistance 
from financial institutions such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund from 2011 onwards.    
Accordingly, these countries had to face many difficulties and impose austerity measures, 
raising taxes and cutting on government spending. Ultimately, they suffered sovereign 
ratings downgrades to non-investment grade levels, in some cases. 
As observed in Figure 4, only in late 2012 the 10Y government bond spread to German 
bund in these countries started to decrease even though the economic turbulence and the 
                                                 
13 “when a new Greek government revealed that previous governments had been misreporting government 
budget data, higher than expected deficit levels eroded investor confidence, causing bond spreads to rise to 
unsustainable levels. Fears quickly spread that the fiscal positions and debt levels of a number of Eurozone 
countries were unsustainable.” (Nelson et al, 2012). 
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efforts demanded from these countries did not stop. The period of higher uncertainty in 
the EU was therefore from 2010 to 2012.  
In conclusion, our sample covers the period between 2001 and 2015 and our crises period 
is comprehended over 2008 to 2012. 
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Sample 
Our initial sample comprises the 28 countries within the European Union, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK. 
4.2.2 Home Bias Measurement  
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) developed the first Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) even if under a strict set of assumptions. The authors showed that the efficient 
portfolio on the Capital Market Line must be the market portfolio and so, all investors 
will hold it, leveraging or de-leveraging it with positions in the risk-free asset to achieve 
a desired level of risk. This model assumes that all investors are of the mean-variance 
type, have the same beliefs about the distribution of real asset returns, that there is 
homogeneity on the investment opportunities and there are no transaction costs or taxes.  
With the great integration of international stock markets, one of the strategic implications 
of the CAPM is that the ultimate equity portfolio (measured in terms of maximum return 
per unit of risk) is the global portfolio. In other words, equity investors should strive to 
own their proportional share of all the world's traded stocks. However, for the CAPM 
model to be valid in a world scale, there must be the assumption that purchasing power 
parity holds, which suggests that the same real rates of return are perceived by all 
investors. 
The strict set of assumptions mentioned led to the development of expansions to the 
model that added factors and relaxed some assumptions. One of those led to the 
International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) developed by Solnik (1974b) and 
Sercu (1980), that not only implies that all investors hold the world market portfolio, but 
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also considers exchange rates as an additional variable that influences the return on assets. 
It allows deviations from purchasing power parity but assumes that inflation risk in each 
country can be perfectly hedged holding a local real-risk-free bond. 
The main assumption it holds on to is that international capital markets are integrated, 
which means that if it proves not to be true, then there is room for price discrepancies 
between assets with the same risk profile, but with different currencies, which would lead 
to a higher allocation of assets in a specific country. It also assumes that there is unlimited 
lending and borrowing at the risk-free rate. 
The conclusion retrieved from this model is that one of the most important factors in an 
investor decision is that he should diversify his portfolio considering his country’s share 
in the world capitalization (Amadi, 2004). The rationale is that the share of country i’s 
equities invested in country j (I*j) is the ratio of market capitalization of country j in the 
world market capitalization.  
where MCj is the market capitalization of country j and MCworld is the world market 
capitalization. This ratio is then the benchmark of portfolio holdings to which the actual 
portfolio holdings are compared. 
Since most of the empirical work on the CAPM considers the freely tradable assets to be 
represented by all the listed stocks, the corresponding market portfolio is commonly taken 
to be a portfolio of all listed public equities. Considering that expectations and 
opportunities remain homogeneous regarding the home country of an investor, then all 
investors would hold the same portfolio of risky assets, which ultimately would be the 
world market portfolio (Cooper et al, 2013).  
Researchers have developed other models that are compiled and analysed in more detailed 
by Mishra (2015), but we decided to use the classical approach because it has been 
extensively used in home bias literature and examples such as Mishra (2015) and Baele 
et al (2007) validate the ICAPM and show that it holds for a large part of their sample.  
 I*j =
𝑀𝐶𝑗
𝑀𝐶𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑
 (4.1) 
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Following most of the studies on the theme14, we measure Equity Home Bias using the 
traditional approach where it represents the difference between actual and ICAPM 
weights. Thus, allows to account for the degree in which domestic equity is overweighed 
in country i’s investment portfolio when compared to foreign equity, through equation 
4.2: 
Foreign Equityi = share of country i's holdings of foreign equity in country i's total equity portfolio (1 - 
share of domestic equity); 
Foreign Equity to Total Marketi = the share of foreign equity in the world portfolio available to country i 
(1- share of country i in the total market capitalization). 
This ratio is expected to be equal to zero in a scenario where there is no preference for 
equity issued domestically and between 0 and 1 otherwise. 
For cross-border holdings we use the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) data to obtain country specific estimates of non-
domestic equity holdings from 2001 to 2015. Hence, we use Table 11: Geographic 
Breakdown of Total Portfolio Investment Assets: Equity and Investment Fund Shares to 
obtain data for Foreign Equity (foreign investments of country i) and for Foreign Holdings 
of Domestic Equities. CPIS data identifies country-level year-end holdings15 of non-
domestic securities for IMF member countries, however, participation in the survey is 
voluntary, which means that not all data is available. Another feature of this database is 
that some members do not disclose the dollar value of their foreign holdings when they 
believe investors’ anonymity is at stake. In the case there is a missing holding value the 
return is a blank cell, as it was not reported. Finally, all cases where the dollar value is at 
or below US$500.000 a zero is reported.  
                                                 
14 See Ahearne et al, 2004; Schoenmaker and Bosch, 2008; Warnock, 2002; Kho et al 2009, for example 
15 CPIS data is collected by the IMF on end-June (as of 2013) and end-December with a lag of about 
seven months after the measurement date, and published within nine months after the reference date 
 𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑖 = 1 −  
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
 
(4.2) 
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Finally, domestic market capitalization was retrieved from Datastream but was not 
available for all countries in the period considered.  
Financial centres such as Luxembourg, Ireland and Cyprus were excluded from the 
dataset as they represent outliers, as most portfolio investments directed to these countries 
are routed from there to other destinations (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008) due to 
favourable tax policies.  
Due to data unavailability, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia were not included in 
our sample.  
Given these data limitations, our final sample is comprised of 21 countries. 
In Figure 6, we can observe that the dependent variable, Equity Home Bias, is behaving 
according to literature over our sample period, meaning that it has diminished through 
time, but it remains in considerably high levels. Additionally, as the ECB monthly 
Bulletin (May 2010, p. 38) evidences, Home Bias in Euro Area countries diminished in 
2008 comparing with 2007, which was attributed to the lower levels of domestic market 
capitalisation. After 2008 (the peak of the global financial crisis) we can observe that 
Equity Home Bias rose, which is consistent with the rationale that crises generate greater 
uncertainties. The same Bulletin also indicates that this rise is probably related to the 
temporary increase in the risk of holding a foreign asset and concludes that a prolonged 
upward trend could generate “important negative implications for global financial market 
efficiency and ultimately, for the real cost of finance.”. 
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Figure 6: Home Bias Evolution in the EU 
Source: IMF, Datastream and our own calculation 
 
4.2.3 Institutional/Fundamental and Behavioural determinants of EHB: 
proxy variables  
We proxy the arguments provided in the literature using the following variables.  
• Direct Barriers 
1. Financial Openness (FINOP): We use the The Chinn and Ito Capital Openness Index 
(KA_OPEN) as a proxy for financial liberalization. It was first introduced by Chin and 
Ito (2006) and is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The variables 
include the presence of multiple exchange rates, the existence of restrictions on current 
account transactions, the existence of restrictions on capital account transactions and 
the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. Hence, by its structure, the Chinn-
Ito index is a de-jure measure of financial openness (Mondria & Wu, 2010). Values 
vary from 0, which represents the “least financial open” countries, to 100 that 
embodies the “most financially open” countries. The data was retrieved from a 2014 
update from Portland State University based on Chin and Ito (2006). Data for 2015 is 
not available. 
2. Withholding tax on dividends (TAXDIV): We use the withholding tax rate on 
dividends and, following Mishra and Ratii (2013) rationale, we report the highest rate 
available. Data was sent by Deloitte (DITS) and is only available as of 2007.  
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• Information Asymmetry 
3. Geographical Distance (DISTANCE): Following the work of Portes and Rey (2005), 
we first compute the flight distance between two capital cities (the authors also 
analysed the distance between financial centres and arrived to the same results) and 
afterwards, we average those results and apply the logarithm (Cooper et al, 2013). The 
values were retrieved from World Atlas. 
4. Internet use (INTERNET): This proxy is the total number of internet users per 100 
persons and was retrieved from the World Banks’s World Development Indicators 
based on the works of Mondria & Wu (2010) and Amadi (2004). 
 
• Hedging 
5. Exchange Rates (FOREX): Following De Moor and Vanpée (2013), we approach this 
hypothesis by creating a dummy variable (Euro), which takes the value 1 if the country 
is an EMU member, and zero otherwise. 
 
• Familiarity 
6. Exchange Trade (TRADE): We compute the method presented by Mishra (2015) 
which sums the imports and exports of goods and services for each year in the sample 
period, divided by the Gross Domestic Product of the domestic country. Data is 
retrieved from the World Bank.  
 
• Governance and Regulation 
7. Domestic Governance and Regulation (RL and RQ): Kaufmann et al (2010)’s six 
governance measures contemplate numerous aspects of the governance structures of a 
broad of cross section of countries. The information is gathered through cross-
countries surveys as well as polls of experts. There are six indicators, each representing 
a different dimension of governance – Voice and Accountability, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, Control of Corruption – where a higher level for these variables 
corresponds to a better governance outcome. We followed Mishra (2008) and used two 
indicators: Rule of Law (RL) and Regulatory Quality (RQ). Rule of Law index focuses 
on concepts related with the enforceability of government and private contracts, 
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fairness of judicial system, the quality of contract enforcement and the likelihood of 
violent and organised crimes. Regulatory Quality index consists of indicators related 
with the ability of the government to implement strong policies and regulations to 
promote the private sector development, namely indicators related with regulation of 
imports and exports, business ownerships, banking, foreign investment, price controls, 
tariffs, unfair competitive prices, among others. These yearly data were retrieved from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Data for 2001 not available.  
 
• Concentration 
8. Company Concentration (COMPCONC): We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to 
measure company diversification by computing the sum of the square of the market 
share of each listed company. Data retrieved from Datastream.  
9. Industry Concentration (INDCONC): We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to 
measure industry diversification by summing the square of the weight of an industry 
in the index market capitalization of each country. Data retrieved from Datastream. 
 
• Size 
10. Market Size (MKTSIZE): We measure the market size as the log value of origin 
country’s market share of the world market capitalization (Mishra, 2015). Data 
retrieved from Datastream. 
4.3 Empirical Models 
We propose a model to analyse the effects of the main arguments in the literature on 
Equity Home Bias and account for eventual differences in periods of major economic 
shocks. 
To estimate the model parameters, we use panel data composed of 21 (countries) x 15 
(years) observations. 
Panel data has both cross-sectional and time series dimensions and to gather such 
information, the same individuals are followed across time, and thus provides multiple 
observations on each individual in the sample. Time-constant unobserved attributes’ 
presence must thus be considered (Wooldridge, 2013) and panel data allows to control 
for omitted (unobserved) variables.  
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The most used methods dealing with panel data are pooled OLS, the Fixed Effects and 
the Random Effects model and so we will do the appropriate tests to conclude on which 
model is the most suitable for our analysis. 
In the interest of taking advantage of most of the sample observations and get reliable 
results, we will perform a baseline model and after we will gradually introduce additional 
variables into robustness checks. These additional variables include another source of 
direct barriers, such as taxes, and the concentration control variables.  
Moreover, the major contribution of our work is to analyse different time periods to 
account for the impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis periods on Equity Home Bias. Thus, we use the following specifications. 
Our baseline empirical model is described by the following regression equation:  
Where i refers to the domestic country and t to the year time period. On the left side of 
the equation we have the dependent variable Equity Home Bias of country i and year t, 
𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑖,𝑡, computed as described in section 4.2.2. On the right side of the equation we 
considered the independent variables suggested by the literature, as described in the 
previous section. As for the error term, represented by 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is composed by 𝛼𝑖  which 
captures all unobserved, time-constant factors that affect the dependent variable, and 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 which represents unobserved factors that change over time and affect the 𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
(Wooldridge, 2013) when the models are of fixed or random effects.  
Furthermore, we developed an extended model to study the impact of the financial and 
economic crises on EHB, which uses as a basis equation (4.3) but includes additional 
variables i) a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years between 2008-2012 
(the crises period) and 0 otherwise (the non-crises period); ii) seven variables resulting 
from the product between such dummy and each independent variable (FINOP, 
INTERNET, FOREX, TRADE, RL, RQ and MKTSIZE). The parameters associated with 
 
𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (4.3) 
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these variables are estimates of the differential effect of those variables on EHB in periods 
of crisis. This model is described as follows:  
where i refers to the domestic country and t to the year time period.  
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 illustrates the summary statistics we computed for the variables used in our 
analysis. The classical Equity Home Bias measure ranges from 6.6% for Portugal in 2012 
to 99.9% for Bulgaria in 2003. Throughout our sample, the Equity Home Bias measure 
has a mean of 67.6%.  
The average coefficient of the financial openness variable is 90.7%, which indicates an 
average low level of direct barriers in our sample, further a few countries exhibit the 
maximum level of financial openness (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK have displayed the maximum 
value throughout the whole period of our sample).   
Overall, the coefficient of the tax on dividends variable is of 17.3%, with the maximum 
rate of 75% referring to France. This rate only increases to this level in 2015 and is for 
payments made on companies located in noncooperative countries.  
Malta is the country that most positively contributes for the exchange trade coefficient, 
with a ratio of 3.25. The governance variables RL and RQ have a mean of approximately 
1.14 and 1.2, respectively, in a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, which indicates that our sample has, 
on average, a good governance quality. The concentration coefficients show that our 
sample has a diversified set of companies and industries that vary very widely across 
countries. The average value of the market capitalization translates into a weight of 
 
𝐸𝐻𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽0𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′1𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡2 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽′2𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽′3𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′4𝐷𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′5𝐷𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′6𝐷𝑅𝑄𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′7𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (4.4) 
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approximately 1% of the market capitalization of the countries of our sample in the world 
market capitalization. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the sample characteristics for the 21 EU countries over the period 2001 to 2015. EHB is 
computed as in equation 4.2. FINOP is the logarithm of the Chinn and Ito Index. TAXDIV is the highest withholding 
tax rate on dividends. DISTANCE is the logarithm of the average of the sum of the bilateral flight distance between 
origin and destination capital cities. INTERNET is the total number of internet users per 100 people. FOREX is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the currency is EUR and 0 otherwise. TRADE is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. RL is the Rule of Law index from 
Kaufmann et al (2010) six governance measures. RQ is the Regulatory Quality index from Kaufmann et al (2010) six 
governance measures. COMPCONC is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the square of the 
market share of each listed company. INDCONC is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the square 
of the weight of an industry in the index market capitalization of each country. MKTSIZE is the log value of a country’s 
market share of world market capitalization.  
a Indicates that variables are expressed in percent.  
 
4.5 Correlation Matrix 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the independent variables used in our baseline 
model. The signs reported from this matrix should be considered as merely preliminary 
results, since they are just taking into account the impact of one variable at each time in 
Equity Home Bias.  
We followed Cooper et al (2016) rationale that considered higher than 0,5 correlations 
among independent variables to be too high and thus, demand to be more carefully 
analysed because they can induce to lower significance levels. Our correlation matrix 
indicates a strong correlation among some sets of independent variables, such as our 
governance variables RL and RQ with INTERNET and with MKTSIZE and even among 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Obs
EHB
a 67.5821 65.4539 99.9255 6.6178 21.8543 247
FINOP
a 90.6612 100.0000 100.0000 16.4809 20.7721 294
TAXDIV
a 17.2592 19.0000 75.0000 0.0000 11.4188 189
DISTANCE 3.1545 3.1307 3.5586 2.9936 0.1395 315
INTERNET
a 59.0781 62.4000 96.3009 4.5000 22.8743 315
FOREX 0.5524 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4980 315
TRADE 1.0205 0.8587 3.2450 0.4560 0.5179 315
RL 1.1375 1.1623 2.1204 -0.2688 0.6426 294
RQ 1.1998 1.1740 1.9219 -0.0722 0.4276 294
COMPCONC
a 11.2306 9.1018 95.4849 2.4135 10.0457 209
INDCONC
a 14.7391 11.5312 97.4443 4.1671 10.3956 209
MKTSIZE
a 0.9691 0.1724 8.1456 0.0000 1.6649 261
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them. TRADE and MKTSIZE also have a strong negative correlation. Given these 
correlations, and according to Cooper et al (2016), we will define 5 separate regression 
specifications, including, in turn, each variable. 
In the following chapter, we will compute the impact of our variables in Equity Home 
Bias and conclude on their impact in the periods before and after the two economy shocks 
– Global Financial Crisis and European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
37 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
This table presents the correlation matrix amongst the independent variables of equation 4.3. FINOP is the logarithm of the Chinn and Ito Index. DISTANCE is the logarithm of the average of the 
sum of the bilateral flight distance between origin and destination capital cities. INTERNET is the total number of internet users per 100 people. FOREX is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the currency is EUR and 0 otherwise. TRADE is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. RL is the Rule of Law index from 
Kaufmann et al (2010) six governance measures. RQ is the Regulatory Quality index from Kaufmann et al (2010) six governance measures. MKTSIZE is the log value of a country’s market share 
of world market capitalization. 
FINOP DISTANCE INTERNET FOREX TRADE RL RQ MKTSIZE
FINOP  1.0000
DISTANCE  0.0654  1.0000
INTERNET  0.3229 -0.3787  1.0000
FOREX  0.4655 -0.0123  0.2744  1.0000
TRADE -0.1646 -0.1559  0.1648 -0.1250  1.0000
RL  0.4093 -0.2328  0.6104  0.3840  0.0814  1.0000
RQ  0.3718 -0.3374  0.5844  0.2114  0.0668  0.8887  1.0000
MKTSIZE  0.4315 -0.1879  0.3854  0.3472 -0.5777  0.5219  0.5714  1.0000
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5. Empirical Results 
In this Chapter, we present the regression analysis results. We will first compute our 
Baseline Model and we will test to see which model (Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects or 
Random Effects model) is more suited to analyse our regression. Additionally, we will 
analyse an extended model, which will enable us to examine the impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis on the variables that affect 
Equity Home Bias. Finally, we will run some Robustness Checks in order to apply the 
variables that, according to theory and to our Hypotheses, influence Equity Home Bias, 
but due to missing values were not introduced in our Baseline Model.  
5.1 Baseline Empirical Model 
As mentioned, we will use regression (4.3) to run our Baseline Model with pooled OLS, 
or the Fixed Effects model or the Random Effects model, using white’s standard errors 
clustered by country robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within the cluster. 
Firstly, we perform an F-test to the Fixed Effects model to understand if the observed and 
unobserved fixed effects are equal to zero, i.e., if they are equal across all units. Table 4 
allows the conclusion that pooled OLS is not appropriate given the level of confidence of 
the null hypothesis rejection. Additionally, we perform the Hausman (1978) test to select 
between the Fixed Effects and the Random Effects models. The p-value from the 
Hausman (1978) test is significant which leads us to reject the null hypothesis16 and so 
we can conclude that the Fixed Effects model is the most suitable one.  
Table 4: F-test and Hausman test 
 
 
 
 
In the following table, we present the Fixed Effects model and the OLS model, just for 
comparison purposes, of the estimation output of our Baseline Model.
                                                 
16 The null hypothesis for the Hausman (1978) test states that there is no correlation between the unique 
country errors and the regressors in the model, i.e., the preferred model is the Random Effects model. 
Eq F-test Level of Confidence
(1) 32.8102 99.9% 11.0212 ***
(2) 37.0318 99.9% 22.7848 ***
(3) 24.2962 99.9% 26.7446 ***
(4) 27.7341 99.9% 42.2077 ***
(5) 38.8644 99.9% 30.0158 ***
Hausman Test
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Table 5: Estimation Output of the Baseline Model 
This table presents the estimates of the parameters in equation (4.3) using the pooled OLS and the Fixed Effects models, with the variables considered to be highly correlated in section 4.5 separated 
into columns (1) to (5). The dependent variable is EHB, measured as 1 minus the ratio of foreign equity to foreign equity to total market. CONSTANT is the constant term. FINOP is the logarithm 
of the Chinn and Ito Index. DISTANCE is the logarithm of the average of the sum of the bilateral flight distance between origin and destination capital cities. INTERNET is the total number of 
internet users per 100 people. FOREX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the currency is EUR and 0 otherwise. TRADE is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. RL is the Rule of Law index Kaufmann et al (2010) six governance measures. RQ is the Regulatory Quality index from Kaufmann et al (2010) six 
governance measures. MKTSIZE is the log value of a country’s market share of world market capitalization. White standard errors clustered by country are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
constant 122.0448 *** 94.19686 *** 121.9474 *** 106.7961 *** 112.9752 *** 67.64181 *** 123.6303 *** 62.82009 *** 95.81485 *** 142.4570 ***
(4.909612) (2.603365) (2.549991) (3.952588) (1.793662) (5.012441) (2.745524) (4.510314) (2.747264) (8.734064)
FINOP -0.224013 *** 0.031392 -0.400066 *** -0.006932 -0.239430 *** -0.153640 *** -0.219792 *** -0.187321 *** -0.316611 *** -0.259558 ***
(0.032895) (0.038585) (0.029030) (0.033940) (0.031694) (0.020786) (0.032936) (0.028579) (0.024909) (0.035887)
FOREX -12.75349 *** -14.96169 *** -15.75223 *** -6.939777 *** -11.77232 *** -17.34631 *** -15.61489 *** -17.58024 *** -13.97425 *** -2.537295
(1.172709) (3.292197) (2.108950) (2.626236) (0.823732) (3.819981) (0.967374) (3.698167) (1.659540) (4.279997)
INTERNET -0.479378 *** -0.362200 ***
(0.035878) (0.020977)
TRADE -8.408725 *** -34.20336 ***
(1.790667) (5.817782)
RL -15.38363 *** 23.05362 ***
(0.663691) (5.414191)
RQ -22.84911 *** 28.13355 ***
(2.044990) (4.418366)
MKTSIZE -3.687515 *** 19.59293 ***
(0.771713) (3.050343)
R-squared 0.574604 0.895756 0.417024 0.869789 0.521042 0.862838 0.524432 0.876300 0.396733 0.870244
Adjusted R-squared 0.569103 0.884447 0.409485 0.855662 0.514328 0.846577 0.517765 0.861634 0.388933 0.856166
Obs 236 236 236 236 218 218 218 218 236 236
F-statistic 104.4581 *** 79.20398 *** 55.31932 *** 61.57074 *** 77.60108 *** 53.06043 *** 78.66261 *** 59.75237 *** 50.85765 *** 61.81878 ***
Pooled OLS
(2) (3)
Fixed Effects
(5)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
(4)
Pooled OLS Fixed EffectsPooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
(1)
Fixed Effects
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The first model, pooled OLS, translates into pooling the observations together and 
running the regression model, neglecting the cross section and time series nature of our 
data. The major problem with this model is that it does not distinguish between the various 
countries, i.e., by combining the 21 countries by pooling, we are denying the 
heterogeneity or individuality that may exist. The main difference between the Fixed 
Effects and the Random Effects model is whether the predictors/regressors are correlated 
with the country error term. In the latter, it must be admitted that there does not exist 
correlation between the individual effects and the perturbance term and in the Fixed 
Effects model, such correlation exists.  
The adjusted R-square for our equations under the Fixed Effects models is close to 85%, 
which indicates a strong significance of the variables of our model and the p-value of the 
global significance tests allows to conclude on the high accuracy and reliability of our 
independent variables in explaining Equity Home Bias. 
According to our Hypothesis 1 (H1), direct barriers to international capital flows are 
expected to have a positive impact on Equity Home Bias, hence the financial openness 
indicator (FINOP) should have the opposite sign. The regression result has the sign as 
expected and is statistically significant in equations (3), (4) and (5) which is consistent 
with previous findings (Bose et al, 2014; Mondria & Wu, 2010), suggesting that a higher 
level of financial openness allows for better international diversification opportunities, 
and hence, leads to a decrease of Equity Home Bias.  
The results for the FOREX variable are coincident with our Hypothesis 3 (H3) and are 
statistically significant in equations (1) to (4), meaning that the negative coefficient from 
this variable indicates that the existence of exchange rates barriers has a positive impact 
on the Equity Home Bias. These results are also present in other empirical findings (e.g. 
Bose et al, 2014). 
In Hypothesis 2 (H2) we infer on the positive relation between information asymmetries 
and Equity Home Bias. Given that the variable DISTANCE is time invariant we could 
not include it in our Fixed Effects model, since it is already being captured (along with 
other time invariant variables) in the dummies of this model. The second variable goes as 
expected, because the rationale of the INTERNET variable is that it behaves opposite the 
information asymmetry one, thus the regression result suggests that there is a negative 
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relation between the number of internet users per 100 people and Equity Home Bias. This 
result indicates that this proxy has a statistically significance at a 1% level, which shows 
that a higher level of internet users suggests the diminishment of information 
asymmetries. These results coincide with previous findings (e.g. Mondria & Wu, 2010; 
Amadi, 2004). 
Our TRADE variable is also behaving according to our Hypothesis 4 (H4), in which it 
was expected a negative relation of a familiarity proxy such as exchange trade and Equity 
Home Bias, meaning that a higher trade of consumer goods indicates a higher financial 
assets’ trade which is then related to an Equity Home Bias decrease. According to our 
results, this variable, apart from having a negative sign, is also statistically significant, 
which coincides with the literature (e.g. Mishra, 2015; Cooper et al, 2013).  
Hypothesis 5 (H5) expected sign and our estimation results are positive for our two 
governance variables – Rule of Law (RL) and Regulatory Quality (RQ). This translates 
into better governance and regulation policies at home, increasing Equity Home Bias, as 
shown in Kho et al (2009). 
Hypothesis 7 (H7) indicates the expected positive relation between a country’s size share 
in the world market capitalization and Equity Home Bias. Our results are in accordance 
with H7 since they indicate that a larger country has better diversification opportunities 
at home and, in fact, it is possible to conclude that a 1% increase in a country’s market 
size generates an approximate 0.19pp increase in Equity Home Bias. This variable is 
statistically significant at a 1% level and is in accordance with the literature (e.g. Mishra, 
2015). 
In conclusion, we can state that the variables of our baseline model can jointly influence 
Equity Home Bias, that our model is appropriate and that our results are in accordance 
with our expectations and the literature’s.  
5.2 Extended Model 
This section’s purpose is to identify the differences in the explanatory power of the 
variables of the baseline model in describing Equity Home Bias when considering the 
Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. In our analysis, we will 
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address this crises period as an uncertainty period and so, in this section, we will also test 
our Hypothesis 8 (H8) – Retrenchment Behaviour.  
As explained in Chapter 4, the Global Financial Crisis effects triggered in 2008 and had 
an observable positive impact in the Equity Home Bias, as seen in Figure 6 and explained 
in section 4.1.1. The European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ impact, in the most affected 
economies, developed in 2010 and lasted, strongly, until 2012, as evidenced in figure 4. 
With this information, we computed a crises period that is comprehended by 2008-2012. 
Firstly, we compute an F-test to each equation to infer on the pertinence of adding these 
variables, i.e., to understand if the analysis using this time break is relevant for our study. 
The result is shown in Appendix A.1 and, given its statistical significance, we can reject 
the null hypothesis that stated that all the additional coefficients were equal to zero.  
After setting the validity of this analysis, we computed equation (4.4) and Table 6 returns 
the output of this regression model using the Fixed Effects model. This model was already 
proven to be the most suited in our Baseline Model, and so, for consistency we will keep 
relying on its results for our analyses. 
 
 
Table 6: Estimation Output of the Extended Model 
This table presents the estimates of the parameters in equation (4.4) using the pooled OLS and the Fixed 
Effects models, with the sets of variables considered to be highly correlated in section 4.5 separated into 
columns (1) to (4). The dependent variable is EHB, measured as 1 minus the ratio of foreign equity to 
foreign equity to total market. CONSTANT is the constant term. DUMMYYEARS is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the year is between 2008 and 2012 and 0 otherwise. FINOP is the logarithm of 
the Chinn and Ito Index. DFINOP is the product between DUMMYYEARS and FINOP. INTERNET is the 
total number of internet users per 100 people. DINTERNET is the product between DUMMYYEARS and INTERNET. 
FOREX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the currency is EUR and 0 otherwise. DFOREX is 
the product between DUMMYYEARS and FOREX. TRADE is the sum of exports and imports of goods 
and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. DTRADE is the product between 
DUMMYYEARS and TRADE. RL is the Rule of Law index Kaufmann et al (2010) six governance 
measures. RQ is the Regulatory Quality index from Kaufmann et al (2010) six governance measures. DRL 
is the product between DUMMYYEARS and RL. RQ is the Regulatory Quality index from Kaufmann et al (2010) 
six governance measures. DRQ is the product between DUMMYYEARS and RQ. MKTSIZE is the log value of a 
country’s market share of world market capitalization. DMKTSIZE is the product between 
DUMMYYEARS and MKTSIZE. White standard errors clustered by country are in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Estimation Output of the Extended Model (cont.) 
 
constant 118.0586 *** 91.26038 *** 126.2611 *** 111.0283 *** 110.2787 *** 62.46627 *** 120.9012 *** 58.29952 *** 95.53293 *** 131.1331 ***
(3.685714) (2.924680) (4.016090) (5.080360) (1.271646) (6.558406) (1.970746) (4.850051) (4.391939) (12.65387)
DUMMYYEARS 42.03211 *** 0.349018 -3.170627 -3.222648 12.10687 *** 0.225500 14.82569 *** 0.161998 2.049221 11.93759 ***
(6.244292) (4.562101) (5.101184) (3.659177) (2.352794) (5.156131) (4.214095) (4.120495) (5.253685) (3.710018)
FINOP -0.183840 *** 0.062908 -0.398594 *** 0.041640 * -0.185722 *** -0.072629 ** -0.178257 *** -0.092332 ** -0.304547 *** -0.180193 ***
(0.030890) (0.038231) (0.047693) (0.024975) (0.033717) (0.044028) (0.040352) (0.048899) (0.040910) (0.058383)
DFINOP -0.304803 *** -0.133157 *** -0.071901 -0.112291 *** -0.179428 *** -0.097124 -0.153419 *** -0.142135 *** -0.089188 * -0.153868 ***
(0.038400) (0.040872) (0.058186) (0.040565) (0.040661) (0.047172) (0.053567) (0.045505) (0.045679) (0.032069)
FOREX -12.21100 *** -15.33363 *** -15.15435 *** -12.74995 *** -11.67261 *** -15.55711 *** -14.66101 *** -17.33039 *** -11.43505 *** -0.356141
(1.748157) (0.050274) (3.212747) (3.305995) (0.954456) (5.070307) (1.403070) (4.957060) (2.152392) (4.044751)
DFOREX -1.183291 -1.074569 -3.275081 0.189262 1.464646 1.618003 -1.310516 3.007775 -6.104721 ** -0.069981
(2.343854) (0.057795) (3.557581) (1.310676) (1.737351) (2.188272) (2.260079) (1.920839) (2.435785) (1.759972)
INTERNET -0.498858 *** -0.342897 ***
(0.037335) (4.334475)
DINTERNET -0.142146 ** 0.165484 ***
(0.060027) (1.581208)
TRADE -12.56092 *** -37.63084 ***
(2.220499) (5.896030)
DTRADE 9.472613 *** 8.274293 ***
(2.647219) (1.889525)
RL -15.38843 *** 22.29603 ***
(0.538301) (5.320047)
DRL -2.144316 * 1.176360
(1.193310) (1.697811)
RQ -22.31246 *** 26.46589 ***
(2.344374) (3.286828)
DRQ -4.894795 4.400546 **
(4.143067) (2.373329)
MKTSIZE -3.462628 *** 17.59397 ***
(1.051018) (4.038674)
DMKTSIZE -2.057940 1.418463
(1.426624) (1.147971)
R-squared 0.597614 0.901621 0.435174 0.891691 0.542635 0.881755 0.547820 0.894586 0.418100 0.887000
Adjusted R-squared 0.585260 0.888851 0.417833 0.877632 0.527389 0.864952 0.532747 0.879606 0.400235 0.872332
Obs 236 236 236 236 218 218 218 218 236 236
F-statistic 48.37430 *** 70.60283 *** 25.09492 *** 63.42362 *** 35.59309 *** 52.47543 *** 36.34522 *** 59.71932 *** 23.40288 *** 60.47072 ***
Pooled OLS
(2) (3)
Fixed EffectsPooled OLS Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
(1)
Fixed Effects
(5)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
(4)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
44 
The adjusted R-square value of these estimations output indicates a value of 
approximately 88%, on average, which reinforces the idea that our independent variables 
are good contributors to the explanation of our model, which translates into our Crises 
Period Model being appropriate. Additionally, the p-value of the global significance test 
suggests that the independent variables are appropriate and accurate in explaining our 
dependent variable.  
By analysing the output of the extended model, we can infer that the level of financial 
openness (FINOP) is negative and statistically significant through the non-crises period 
in equations (3) to (5) and in equations (1) and (2), the estimated impact on EHB is 
positive. In the 2008-2012 period, there is empirical evidence that the estimated impact 
on Equity Home Bias changed in equations (1), (2), (4) and (5), with FINOP negatively 
impacting EHB by 0.07pp, 0.07pp, 0.23pp and 0.33pp, respectively, when it increased 
1pp, given the parameter statistical significance level. In equation (3), the estimated 
negative impact of FINOP, in the crises period, was of 0.17pp when EHB increased 1pp, 
however there is not statistical evidence of a change in impact from the non-crises to the 
crises period. These negative estimated impacts of the abolishment of direct barriers is as 
expected according to Hypothesis 1 (H1), but do not support Hypothesis 8 (H8) argument, 
since there was a higher negative impact from FINOP in the crises period, rather than in 
the non-crises period. It could be concluded that investors do not interpret a generalized 
mistrust surrounding financial markets as a barrier to international investment. 
FOREX proved to have a negative estimated impact in EHB at statistically significant 
level in the non-crises period in equations (1) to (4). This result is consistent with our 
Hypothesis 3 (H3), which indicates that the non-existence of exchange rate barriers has a 
negative impact on EHB. However, even though the estimated impact in EHB for the 
crises period is negative in all equations, there is no empirical evidence of a change in 
such impact from the non-crises period to the 2008-2012 one.  
The high statistical significance of INTERNET enables us to infer on the relevance of the 
number of internet users per 100 persons for the Equity Home Bias on the non-crises 
period, generating a negative estimated impact of -0.34pp considering a 1pp increase in 
this variable, which is as expected by our Hypothesis 2 (H2). Also, the high statistical 
significance of DINTERNET allows the conclusion that there is empirical evidence of a 
change in the impact of the coefficient during the crises period, i.e., INTERNET had a 
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lower negative estimated impact on EHB since a 1pp increase in the number of internet 
users per 100 people only generated a decrease of 0.17pp (-0.3429+0.1655) in the Equity 
Home Bias in the 2008-2012 period. This result could indicate that during times of 
uncertainty, investors find that the lower information costs given the higher information 
availability and easiness, is less appealing in inciting them to internationally diversify 
their portfolios.  
In addition, there is also empirical evidence for the estimated impact of the familiarity 
proxy on EHB being less negative (29pp) during the crises period than in the non-crises 
period (37pp), considering a 1 unit increase in TRADE. These results are as expected by 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) and show that the negative impact on EHB diminishes in times of 
retrenchment.  
Moreover, our Rule of Law governance variable is statistically significant in the non-
crises period and has a positive estimated impact on Equity Home Bias of 22pp, 
considering a 1 unit increase in the rule of law index. In the crises period, the estimated 
negative impact is of 23pp, although there is no empirical evidence for a change is such 
impact. These results are sustained by our Hypothesis 5 (H5) since they reveal that in the 
whole period of our sample domestic investors are strongly driven by the quality of 
contract enforcement, of the courts and the police, hence the respect of the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions is important in the investment-
decision time, which results in a higher Equity Home Bias. 
Regulatory Quality (RQ), our other governance variable, also has a positive estimated 
impact in EHB during the non-crises period, which is therefore according to our 
Hypothesis 5 (H5). In this case, there is empirical evidence for the change in the estimated 
impact of RQ in EHB, which ultimately results in a positive effect of 30.84pp in the crises 
period (rather than a rise of 26.46pp in the non-crises period) given a 1 unit in the 
regulatory quality index. These coefficients suggest that during times of uncertainty, 
domestic investors are even more driven by the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies. This result also gives robustness to our 
Hypothesis 8 (H8), since in times of uncertainty there is a generalized decline of business 
confidence and so, this could explain the shift in the impact of regulatory quality on EHB, 
i.e., investors were so mistrust in financial markets, institutions, governments, etc., that 
the extent to which agents perceived the ability of a government to implement regulations 
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that permit and promote private sector development, incited more domestic investment, 
leading to a more pronounced positive impact on Equity Home Bias. 
Finally, MKTSIZE is statistically significant, which indicates that the size of the market 
had a positive estimated impact of 0.17pp, considering a 1% increase in the size ratio 
generated during the non-crises period and of 0.19pp in the crises period, even though 
there is no empirical evidence for the change in the impact in the crises period. These 
results complement our Hypothesis 7 (H7), since they translate into higher diversification 
opportunities at home, enabled by the bigger share of a country’s size in the world market 
capitalization, increasing EHB. 
Table 7 below evidences the conclusions regarding the signs and impacts of the 
coefficients studied in our Baseline model and in our Extended model.  
Table 7: Estimation Coefficients and Expected Signs: the Impact of Economy Shocks 
 
We can conclude that, overall, the signs of the estimated impacts in the non-crises period 
and in the crises period were not changed. 
In one hand, the ones that negatively influenced EHB in the non-crises period (FINOP, 
FOREX, INTERNET and TRADE), in the 2008-2012 period maintained their negative 
estimated impact but at lower levels, except for FINOP.  
On the other hand, those with a positive impact in the non-crises period (RL, RQ and 
MKTSIZE), amplified their effects in the 2008-2012 period.  
Eq Sign Impact (pp) Sign Impact (pp) Sign Impact (pp) Sign
(1) INSIGNIFICANT INSIGNIFICANT -0.07
(2) INSIGNIFICANT + +0.04 -0.07
(3) -0.15 - -0.07 -0.07
(4) -0.18 - -0.09 -0.23
(5) -0.29 - -0.18 -0.33
(1) -14.96 -15.33 -16.41
(2) -6.93 -12.75 -12.56
(3) -17.34 -15.55 -13.94
(4) -17.58 -17.33 -14.32
(5) -2.54 -0.37 -0.43
INTERNET (1) - -0.36 - -0.34 - -0.17 -
TRADE (2) - -34.20 - -37.63 - -29.35 -
RL (3) + +23.05 + +22.29 + +23.47 +
RQ (4) + +28.13 + +26.46 + +30.84 +
MKTSIZE (5) + +0.19 + +0.17 + +0.19 +
Expected Sign 
according to our 
Hypotheses
Baseline Model
2001-2015
Crises Period
2008-2012
Non-Crises Period
2001-2007 ; 2013-2015
Crises Period Model
-
- --FINOP
FOREX - --
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In conclusion, these results contribute to what we exposed in Hypothesis 8 (H8) in the 
sense that they show that there are more variables impacting less negatively/more 
positively the EHB in periods of uncertainty. 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we will introduce, in turn, the variables that were not part of our previous 
models to infer on their relationship with the hypotheses we developed in Chapter 3. As 
mentioned, they were not included earlier due to their missing values, so our analysis will 
be made considering the reduction in the sample. For this analysis, we aim to continue 
using equation (4.4) using fixed effects, and add, one by one, our additional variables. 
However, we will first test to see if we can use such equation or if we can just rely on 
equation (4.3). For that, we will perform an F-test with the null hypothesis being that all 
added coefficients are equal to zero.  
Table 10 from Appendix A.1 allows to infer that we can only reject the null hypothesis 
for equations (7) and (8). Thus, for equation (6) we will not be able to conclude on the 
crises period impact, but solely on the impact of the withholding tax on dividends on 
Equity Home Bias throughout the sample period. As for equations (7) and (8), the analysis 
will be consistent to the one presented in the previous section. 
Table 8 evidences the 3 estimation outputs, where (6) refers to the introduction of the 
other proxy for information asymmetry – TAXDIV – and (7) and (8) indicate the addition 
of our concentration variables, COMPCONC and INDCONC, respectively.  
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of the robustness checks of equations (6) using equation 4.3 
and equations (7) and (8) using equations 4.4., using the Fixed Effects model. The dependent variable is 
EHB, measured as 1 minus the ratio of foreign equity to foreign equity to total market. CONSTANT is the 
constant term. DUMMYYEARS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is between 2008 
and 2012 and 0 otherwise. FINOP is the logarithm of the Chinn and Ito Index. DFINOP is the product 
between DUMMYYEARS and FINOP. TAXDIV is the highest withholding tax rate on dividends. 
DTAXDIV is the product between DUMMYYEARS and TAX DIV. COMPCONC is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the square of the market share of each listed company. 
DCOMPCONC is the product between DUMMYYEARS and COMPCONC. INDCONC is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the square of the weight of an industry in the index market 
capitalization of each country. White standard errors clustered by country are in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
constant -1.068929 64.03615 *** 63.71026 ***
(8.637299) (1.848220) (1.781053)
DUMMYYEARS 7.556799 *** 4.153429
(1.594994) (3.346065)
FINOP 0.819621 *** -0.001444 -0.001600
(0.076716) (0.018745) (0.019465)
DFINOP -0.133099 *** -0.112188 ***
(0.028438) (0.034690)
FOREX -19.10855 ***
(3.302334)
DFOREX
TAXDIV -0.009891
(0.332709)
DTAXDIV
COMPCONC 0.030525
(0.028676)
DCOMPCONC 0.019500
(0.110777)
INDCONC 0.043791
(0.029413)
DINDCONC 0.112646
(0.101913)
R-squared 0.904485 0.905512 0.905035
Adjusted R-squared 0.886116 0.890975 0.890425
Obs 125 151 151
F-statistic 49.24150 *** 62.29170 *** 61.94632 ***
Sample 2007-2014 2001-2014 2001-2014
(6) (7) (8)
Using equation 4.4Using equation 4.3 Using equation 4.4
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All three regressions have a high adjusted R-squared and significant F-statistics, which 
indicates that the three models are appropriate and the independent variables can jointly 
and accurately explain Equity Home Bias.  
The withholding tax rate on dividends in our regression reveals to be statistically 
insignificant to Equity Home Bias from 2007-2014, which is the whole sample for 
equation (6). This result is not as expected according to our Hypothesis 1 (H1) because 
there should be empirical support for the negative impact of this direct barrier on EHB. 
However, FINOP, also a proxy for direct barriers on investment, reveals to have a positive 
impact on EHB during this period. One conclusion we can gather is that this period is 
very close to our crises period, and so we can infer that the latter is a consequence of 
retrenchment, though that still does not explain TAXDIV behaviour. We are left with the 
rationale that, in that time period, investors did not find this direct barrier to be of interest 
in their investment decision, even though, theory does not support such conclusion.   
In equations (7) and (8), the concentration variables COMPCONC and INDCONC also 
reveal to be statistically insignificant to EHB, both in the crises and non-crises periods 
aligned with the fact that there is no empirical evidence for the change in their impact in 
the crises period. These results are then not expected according to our Hypothesis 6 (H6), 
because investors should aim to reduce their concentration risk either on a company or 
industry level, especially in times of uncertainty.  
In conclusion, we can state that the additional variables constituting our robustness checks 
did not produce any empirical evidence of the impact to Equity Home Bias in the periods 
considered, which was a surprising result since it was not expected according to our 
Hypotheses. These results allow to infer that, in our sample, investor do not find the 
withholding tax rate on dividends nor the company and industry concentration to be 
relevant variables to their investment decisions.  
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6. Conclusions 
Equity Home Bias has been studied for several decades and financial literature describes 
it as a puzzle because even though many possible explanations have emerged, neither has 
the power to explain its evolution and persistence through time.  
The common realization has been that it cannot be explained by just one factor, but by a 
variety of them, grouped together into two main sources. The first one is linked to 
institutional or fundamental arguments, which are driven by a cost-benefit approach such 
as transaction costs, trade flows, information costs, governance, among others. The other 
one is related to behavioural explanations, which are, intuitively, influenced by the 
investor’s conduct, such as familiarity, conservatism, overconfidence, etc. In addition, we 
completed this inference by highlighting the role of financial or economic crises, which 
have a direct impact in the investment pattern of investors and, thus, could affect Equity 
Home Bias.  
In fact, there is also an approach that focuses on the Equity Home Bias (mis)calculation 
as a factor that could generate misleading results, but as Mishra (2015) summarized, the 
use of different benchmarks enables to obtain different home bias results, however, not 
as different as to disregard its existence and general idea, i.e., that it has been considerably 
high over time.  
In this paper, we propose to analyse how the financial and economic crises impacted 
Equity Home Bias determinants over the period from 2001 to 2015 in EU countries. We 
analyse the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. We 
observed, beforehand, that, when the Global Financial Crisis arose, Equity Home Bias 
increased, which was as we expected according to the retrenchment theory.  
Our baseline model estimates show that our proxy for information asymmetry (number 
of internet users) had a negative impact on Equity Home Bias, as expected and regarded 
by Mondira & Wu (2010), indicating that the lower the barriers of information flows, the 
more investors seek investment opportunities in foreign markets. Also, in general, the 
level of financial openness and the abolishment of exchange rate risk have a negative 
effect on Equity Home Bias, as expected and based on the works of Mondria & Wu (2010) 
and Bose et al (2014), respectively. In addition, our proxies for familiarity (Mishra, 2015; 
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Cooper et al, 2013), governance (Kho et al, 2009) and market size (Mishra, 2015) are 
associated with higher Home Bias, as expected.  
Afterwards, we run a model specification to control for the effects of both the crises. We 
show that, in general, our proxy for direct barriers (the level of a country’s financial 
openness) has a negative effect on Home Bias, as expected, but its impact is more negative 
in the crises period. The exchange rate risk proxy has, in general and as expected, a 
negative effect on Home Bias, however, there is no empirical evidence of a change in the 
estimated impact during the crises period. The information asymmetry and trade proxies 
have a less negative estimated impact on Equity Home Bias, suggesting that investors 
tend to internationally diversify more their portfolios in periods of greater uncertainty. 
Both governance and regulation proxies have a positive estimated impact on Home Bias, 
with the Regulatory Quality index having empirical evidence for its amplified effect in 
the crisis period, contrary to the Rule of Law index. Market size maintained its positive 
impact on Home Bias, but also with no empirical evidence for the more positive effect in 
the crises period. 
We were able to conclude that Equity Home Bias is more positively/less negatively 
impacted during the crises period, which reveals that in uncertainty periods investors are 
more averse to investing in foreign markets. 
Additionally, when we add three more variables to our model that were left out due to 
data unavailability, we conclude that nor our direct barrier proxy (taxes) nor the company 
and industry concentration in the domestic market one have empirical evidence for a 
change in their impact on Equity Home Bias in the crises period. 
Overall, we found support for institutional/fundamental and behavioural arguments since, 
first, our proxies produced an effect on Equity Home Bias and followed such theories and 
explanations. We also realized that in times of greater uncertainty there is a tendency for 
the proxies’ impact to change.  
In addition, since most empirical work on Equity Home Bias focuses more on the impact 
of different variables, within different countries or different periods, we believe we made 
an important contribution to the finance literature by focusing on studying the differences 
of the economic and financial crises impact on EHB. 
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We believe further research could be made based on our rationale but regarding different 
dependent variables, such as Debt Home Bias or Foreign Bias. Also, other independent 
variables could be added, namely, a higher focus could be given to the realized returns on 
each domestic market. Finally, using a wider sample, it would be possible to compare the 
impact of the different institutional and behavioural effects between developed and 
developing countries and if they respond in similar ways in periods of crisis.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A.1 – Statistic Tests 
Table 9: Extended Model F-test 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Robustness Checks F-test 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Equation F-test Level of Confidence
(1) 3.1001 97.5%
(2) 10.5153 99.9%
(3) 7.5991 99.9%
(4) 8.2397 99.0%
(5) 4.9239 99.0%
Equation F-test Level of Confidence
(6) 1.2669 -
(7) 6.4270 99.9%
(8) 6.3714 99.9%
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Appendix A.2 – Robustness Checks 
Table 11: Robustness Checks – Complementary Outputs 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of the complementary robustness checks of equations (6) using 
equation 4.4 and equations (7) and (8) using equations 4.3., using the Fixed Effects model. The dependent 
variable is EHB, measured as 1 minus the ratio of foreign equity to foreign equity to total market. 
CONSTANT is the constant term. DUMMYYEARS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
year is between 2008 and 2012 and 0 otherwise. FINOP is the logarithm of the Chinn and Ito Index. 
DFINOP is the product between DUMMYYEARS and FINOP. TAXDIV is the highest withholding tax 
rate on dividends. DTAXDIV is the product between DUMMYYEARS and TAX DIV. COMPCONC is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the square of the market share of each listed 
company. DCOMPCONC is the product between DUMMYYEARS and COMPCONC. INDCONC is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the square of the weight of an industry in the index 
market capitalization of each country. White standard errors clustered by country are in parenthesis. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
constant 3.836740 65.58073 *** 64.61281 ***
(11.12302) (2.124796) (2.413199)
DUMMYYEARS 11.68120 ***
(3.569960)
FINOP 0.780126 *** -0.043083 ** -0.039739 *
(0.172045) (0.020128) (0.023893)
DFINOP -0.107938 *
(0.063110)
FOREX -22.39588 ***
(4.799765)
DFOREX 3.222152
(2.568571)
TAXDIV 0.095326
(0.371010)
DTAXDIV -0.312300 *
(0.162590)
COMPCONC 0.072359 **
(0.031936)
DCOMPCONC
INDCONC 0.097492 **
(0.039463)
DINDCONC
R-squared 0.909092 0.891072 0.891498
Adjusted R-squared 0.887274 0.877148 0.877629
Obs 125 151 151
F-statistic 41.66712 *** 63.99912 *** 64.28117 ***
Sample 2007-2014 2001-2014 2001-2014
(8)(6) (7)
Using equation 4.3Using equation 4.4 Using equation 4.3
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